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11 Introduction
Germany1, as most other European countries, has been plagued by a persistently
high level of long–term unemployment since the early 1980's.  In contrast, long–
term unemployment is much less of a problem in the United States.  One potential
reason for the different structure of unemployment relates to institutional differen-
ces in unemployment compensation systems.  The German system is characterized
by relatively high income–replacement ratios and extended benefit–entitlement pe-
riods which are often followed by the availability of open–ended unemployment or
social assistance schemes.  In contrast, unemployment insurance payments in the
United States are terminated after about six months as a rule, and entitlement to
subsequent welfare payments are only available to lone mothers and the disabled.
Can these institutional differences explain the higher level of long–term unemploy-
ment in Germany relative to the United States?
For the early 1980's Burtless (1987) has calculated the potential unemployment ef-
fects of more genereous benefit systems in some European countries relative to the
United States.  Applying elasticity estimates from two well–known microeconome-
tric U.S. studies [Moffitt and Nicholson (1982), Moffitt (1985)] to the unemploy-
ment compensationt systems in these countries, he found that differences in their
generosity have contributed only little to the observed differences in unemployment
rates between countries.  In particular, he estimated that the longer entitlement pe-
riod in West Germany relative to the U.S. could have added 2.5 to 4 weeks to the
average completed spell of unemployment in Germany in the early 1980's [Burtless
(1987: 147)].  From this estimate he concluded that only a modest part of the Ger-
man–U.S. unemployment differential could be attributed to the more generous Ger-
man unemployment compensation system.
Since then, there have been some important changes in benefit regulations in Ger-
many.  In particular, maximum entitlement periods for older workers with long pre-
vious employment histories have been extended considerably in several steps.  For
example, the maximum entitlement period for those aged 54 years and older was
successively extended from 12 months before 1985 to 32 months after July 1987.
At the same time, long–term unemployment among older workers has increased
dramatically, while it has declined among the younger unemployed during the eco-
nomic upswing in the second half of the eighties.  Although it seems likely that the
extension of benefit–entitlement periods and the increase of long–term unemployed
among older workers are related, the empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis
for Germany seems far from conclusive.  Recently, there have been some attempts
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 Here, and in the following, "Germany" always refers to the former West Germany before
unification.
2to estimate the effect of the unemployment compensation system on the duration of
unemployment in Germany [Hujer, Löwenbein and Schneider (1990), Wurzel
(1990, 1993), Steiner (1994), Hunt (1995), and Hujer and Schneider (1996)].  Al-
though these studies employ similar econometric models and are based on the same
data source, they come up with quite different results with respect to the effects of
the entitlement to and the level of unemployment compensation on individual un-
employment durations.  Estimation results range from negative to modestly positive
effects, but overall they do not seem to be particularly well determined.  The
reasons for this divergence in results are not clear yet.
This paper analyzes benefit–entitlement effects within a more general model which
encompasses the previous studies' specifications of benefit–entitlement effects on
the duration of individual unemployment.  The main focus here is on the disincen-
tive effects of the successive extension of benefit–entitlement periods in the 1980's.
The next section contains a brief summary of the main economic hypotheses related
to the effects of the unemployment insurance system on the duration of unemploy-
ment.  This section also summarizes the structure of the German unemployment
compensaton system and, in particular, the changes in legal regulations since the
early 1980's.  Section 3 reviews the previous microeconometric studies of benefit–
entitlement effects on the duration of unemployment in Germany mentioned above.
My own econometric analysis of benefit–entitlement effects is contained in section
4 which also contains a brief data description.  The econometric analysis is based on
a discrete–time hazard rate model estimated on waves 1 – 12 of the Socio–Econo-
mic Panel for West Germany covering the period 1983 to 1994.
To preview the main results of the paper based on my preferred specification of the
estimated econometric model, there is strong evidence for entitlement effects for
men, but not for women.  However, long–term unemployment is much more af-
fected if unemployment assistance, which tends to be open–ended, is available after
the exhaustion of unemployment benefits.  On the other hand, simulations show that
even large reductions of the incomes replacement ratio have very little effect on the
duration of unemployment. These results lead to some concluding remarks on the
efficiency of the current German system of unemployment compensation and its re-
cent reform in section 5.
2 Theoretical and Institutional Background
2.1 Entitlement Effects in Labor Supply and Job–Search Models
Two types of economic models have been used as theoretical basis for the empirical
analysis of the relationship between various aspects of unemployment compensation
systems and the duration of individual unemployment spells.  The first approach is a
3straightforward extension of the static neoclassical labor supply model, the second
approach relies on the theory of optimal job–search.  Although these theories start
from very different assumption, they arrive at quite similar conclusions regarding
observable effects of benefits on the duration of individual unemployment spells.
To start with the traditional labor supply model [for a summary see Burtless
(1989)], Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) describe an unemployed worker's decision to
take up a job offerassumed to be always readily availableas utility maximizing
choice between income and leisure subject to a budget constraint.  The only modifi-
cation to the standard set–up is that in the presence of an unemployment insurance
system leisure is subsidized and a limited entitlement period results in a kink in the
budget constraint at the month of benefit exhaustion:  Before this month, remaining
unemployed for another month reduces income by the difference between the
monthly amount of unemployment benefits received and the offered net wage.  The
ratio between these two variables is termed the income–replacement ratio.  Depen-
ding on its size, this segment of the budget constraint may be rather flat while it be-
comes relatively steep after benefit exhaustion.  Given random preferences for in-
come and leisure, a disproportionate number of unemployed people will take up
work in the month after the exhaustion of unemployment benefits.
Its static nature and the assumption that all unemployment is simply leisure make
this model's implications look rather special.  In this respect, job–search theory may
provide a somewhat more realistic description of individual unemployment beha-
vior.  In its most simple version, unemployed individuals facing a known wage dis-
tribution and a constant job offer arrival rate chose a reservation wage that maximi-
zes the present value of expected utility as a function of income and leisure.  This
reservation wage together with the job offer arrival rate and the distribution of offe-
red wages determines the hazard rate, that is the conditional re–employment proba-
bility2, and hence the duration of unemployment.  The hazard rate is decreasing in
the reservation wage which positively depends on the level of ALG.  Since unem-
ployment benefits act as a search subsidy reducing the costs of continued search, the
higher the income–replacement ratio is the longer the duration of unemployment
should ceteris paribus be in this model.
On the basis of a slightly more general version of this model, also allowing for a
varying search intensity, Mortensen (1977) has shown that the hazard rate increases
when the unemployed gets closer to the benefit exhaustion point, because search
intensity is increased and the reservation wage reduced the shorter the remaining
entitlement period becomes.  After benefits are exhausted, the hazard rate remains
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 That is, the conditional probability of leaving the unemployment state in the next "month",
given the spell has already lasted up to this month (see section 4.1 below).
4constant because nothing else changes in this model.  By implication, the hazard
rate for an unemployed without benefit–entitlement should be constant over time.
These predictions only hold if benefit exhaustion is the only source of non–stationa-
rity within an otherwise stationary environment.  However, there are various exten-
sions to this simple model which introduce non–stationarity of some sort or the
other [Lippman and McCall (1976) and Mortenson (1986) provide partial surveys of
the literature].  Depending on the source of non–stationarity assumed, this results in
negative or positive duration dependence of the hazard rate.  Fortunately, this can
be taken into account in the econometric model described below.
Benefit–entitlement effects on individual re–employment probabilities will depend
on the regulations of the prevailing unemployment compensation system, such as
the level of the income–replacement ratio and the length of the entitlement period,
as well as on other aspects of the system, such as the degree of monitoring of an in-
dividual's search effort by the labor office.  In the following, the German unem-
ployment compensation system is therefore briefly described as far as it is relevant
for the subsequent empirical analysis.
2.2 The German Unemployment Compensation System
The unemployment compensation system in Germany consists of two parts.  The
main part is unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld, ALG) which is financed
from contributions levied equally on employees and employers.  The other part, un-
employment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe, ALH), is financed by general government
revenues, but administered like ALG by labor offices.
The basic requirements for the entitlement to ALG are that the applicant is registe-
red as unemployed at the local labor office, is available for job placements, has been
employed a minimum number of days in a given base period, and is not older than
the legal retirement age of 65 years.3  The availability criterion is fulfilled if the un-
employed is available on short notice and ready to accept any "suitable" job or take
part in training courses offered by the labor office.  Until the most recent reform of
the Employment Protection Act ("Arbeitsförderungs–Gesetz"), which came into ef-
fect on April 1, 1997, criteria for a "suitable job" applied by the labor office depen-
ded on the level of formal qualification as well as the required qualification in the
previous job, but also on the duration of the on–going unemployment spell.  Before
1994, only job offers requiring the same level of occupational qualification, special
knowledge and experience as in the previous job were deemed suitable in the first
few months of unemployment.  In the subsequent months of the unemployment
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 These and the following facts rely on the official publication of the German Ministry of La-
bor and Social Affairs [Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Sozialordnung (1995: 99 – 109)].
5spell the requirements of a job offer with respect to its level of qualification could
be adjusted downwards in a stepwise fashion as layed down in special regulations
("Zumutbarkeits–Anordnung") by the Federal Labor Office.  These requirements
were tightened by the reform of the Employment Protection Act in 1994, and again
by the most recent reform which abolished the regulation with respect to the level of
qualification altogether.  Since then, the short–term unemployed (less than 3
months) can be obliged to accept any job offering a net wage of up to 20% less than
in the previous job, provided the offered wage is not less than the relevant wage
layed down in collective bargaining agreements or, in the absence of such agree-
ments, the "common wage" for comparable jobs in the local labor market.  For the
next three months wage offers of up to 30% less than the wage in the previous job
are deemed suitable, while for the subsequent months the level of the unemploy-
ment benefits define the lower bound for "suitable" wage offers an unemployed has
to accept.
The unemployed may also be required to take up such jobs within a travel–to–works
area of up to 2.5 hours a day (3 hours since April 1997), and even longer commu-
ting times are possible under special circumstances layed down in the regulations by
the Federal Labor Office.  Unemployed persons aged 58 years and older who have
decided to take up an early retirement pension because of previous long–term un-
employment at the earliest possible age—usually at 60 years—are not expected to
be available for any kind of job any longer.  In certain seasonal industries, in parti-
cular the construction industry, farming and forestry, employees who were layed–
off because of seasonal slack and are expected to be re–called by their firm when de-
mand picks up are not required to actively search for a job and are offered no job
vacancies by the labor office.
ALG payments can be suspended for up to 12 weeks, and the remaining entitlement
period (see below) cut by 25 percent, if the unemployed rejects a suitable job offer
or training course offered by the labor office without good reason.  In case a sui-
table offer is rejected twice without good reason, entitlement to ALG may be
withdrawn altogether.  Although enforcement of requirements look quite stringent
in theory, withdrawal of ALG entitlement for the reason of refusing a job offer is
very rare in practice.4  Entitlement to ALG is also suspended for up to 12 weeks,
and the remaining entitlement period cut by 25 percent, in case the unemployed has
voluntarily quit the previous job without good reason or was fired for reason of
misconduct.
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 In 1995, when about 2.5 million people were registered as unemployed in west Germany,
unemployment benefit payments were suspended in only about 12,500 cases [Bundesanstalt
für Arbeit (1996), Übersicht 106).
6The required minimum employment period is at least 12 months (360 calendar days)
or, equivalently, certain other spells covered by the unemployment insurance system
within the base period.  These spells include periods of military service, sickness,
maternity leave, and participation in training courses subsidized by the labor offi-
ces.  The base period has been 3 years since July 1987, before that date it was 4 ye-
ars.  There are special regulations for employees in seasonal industries, where only
180 calendar days of employment within the last three years are required.
Table 1—Changes in benefit–entitlement periods since the mid–1980s.
Months worked
in base period
January 1983 –
Dec. 1984
January 1985 –
Dec. 1985
January 1986 –
June 1987
July 1987 –
March 1997
12 4 4 4 6
16 4 4 4 8
18 6 6 6 8
20 6 6 6 10
24 8 8 8 12
28 8 8 8 14 (≥42)
30 10 10 10 14 (≥42)
32 10 10 10 16 (≥42)
36 12 12 12 18 (≥42)
40 12 12 12 20 (≥44)
42 12 14 (≥49) 14 (≥44) 20 (≥44)
44 12 14 (≥49) 14 (≥44) 22 (≥44)
48 12 16 (≥49) 16 (≥44) 24 (≥49)
52 12 16 (≥49) 16 (≥44) 26 (≥49)
54 12 18 (≥49) 18 (≥49) 26 (≥49)
56 12 18 (≥49) 18 (≥49) 28 (≥54)
60 12 18 (≥49) 20 (≥49) 30 (≥54)
64 12 18 (≥49) 20 (≥49) 32 (≥54)
66 12 18 (≥49) 22 (≥54) 32 (≥54)
72 12 18 (≥49) 24 (≥54) 32 (≥54)
Notes:
(a) Age groups to whom the various entitlement periods apply are in parantheses.
(b) The changes introduced by the most recent reform of the Employment Protection Act in 1997
are not included; see text.
Source:  Hunt (1995, Table 1).
The length of benefit–entitlement periods depends on the cumulated duration of in-
sured employment (or equivalent spells mentioned above) within the relevant base
period and on the age of the unemployed person.  For benefit–entitlement periods of
more than 12 months the relevant base period is 7 years.  Entitlement periods have
7been extended substantially for certain age groups between 1985 and 1987 but, ex-
cept for the most recent changes, have remained unchanged since then.  As summa-
rized in Table 1, they range from 6 months for those aged 41 years and younger
with only the minimum employment period to 32 months for those aged 53 and ol-
der with employment of at least 64 months in the base period.  The recent reform
has introduced some changes which will successively be phased in within the next
few years.  The age limits for extended entitlement periods will be raised in inter-
vals of 3 years, such that only those aged 45 years and older will be entitled to re-
ceiving ALG for more than 12 months.  When these reform steps are fully phased
in, only those aged 57 years and older will be entitled to the maximum period of 32
months.
In contrast to ALG, ALH is means–tested and available to those who fulfill the
mentioned requirements for ALG and have either exhausted their entitlement period
("Anschluss–ALH") or have some previous work experience, but cannot prove the
minimum employment period required for ALG ("originäre ALH").  There is no de-
finite previous employment period for this latter type of ALH, except that at least 5
months of insured employment (or equivalent spells covered by the unemployment
insurance system) within the base period of 3 years (4 years before July 1987) are
required.  The means–test takes into account the incomes of all household members
beyond certain fairly small deductions and also household wealth.  Provided this
means–test is passed and the mentioned entitlement criteria are met, ALH is granted
for one year in the first instance.  If household wealth exceeds a certain limit there is
a waiting period before ALH becomes available.  Those entitled to "Anschluss–
ALH" may subsequently apply for a prolongation.  Except for the age limit of 65
years, there is no definite time limit for which this type of ALH can be drawn
provided the mentioned criteria are met, whereas the other type ("originäre ALH" )
is restricted to a period of up to twelve months.
Before 1984 the ratio of ALG to net income in the previous job, i.e., the income–
recplacement ratio, was 68% up to the insured upper threshold amount ("Beitragsbe-
messungsgrenze"), for ALH the respective income–replacement ratio was 58%.
This threshold amount is annually adjusted according to the growth rate of gross
earnings of all employed covered by the social security system.  For example, for
the year 1997 it was set at a level of DM 8,200 of monthly gross earnings in the we-
stern German states, which is an increase of 2.5% from the previous year.  In 1984
the income–replacement ratio for the unemployed without at least one child was cut
to 63% for ALG and to 56% for ALH.  In 1994 the ALG income–replacement ratio
for the unemployed with (without) children was reduced to 67% (60) percent, for
those on ALH it was cut to 57% (53%).  The amount from which ALH is calculated
("Beitragsbemessungsgrundlage") is adjusted by a factor of 0.03 per year of unem-
ployment as long as it exceeds 50% of the economy–wide average net wage of all
dependently employed persons.  However, this adjustment reduces the amount of
8ALH only in case the yearly wage increase is below this adjustment factor.  These
changes affected both ongoing unemployment spells and spells beginning after the
legal changes came into effect.  The most recent reform of the unemployment com-
pensation system tightened eligibility criteria but left income–replacement ratios
unchanged.
3 Previous Empirical Studies for Germany
In his survey on the labor market effects of taxes and transfers covering the period
up to the early 1990's Zimmermann (1993) concludes: "In sum, there is not much
evidence that would confirm the hypothesis that the German system of unemploy-
ment compensation causes unemployment by creating disincentives to work".  Since
then, not much has been published in this area, and the few relevant studies are re-
viewed below.
Empirical studies on the effects of the entitlement to and the level of unemployment
benefits on the duration of unemployment in (west) Germany5 are based on redu-
ced–form hazard rate models.  The hazard rate is the conditional probability of lea-
ving unemployment in the next "month", given unemployment has already lasted
until the beginning of that month (for a formal definition see section 4.1 below).  By
definition, it is inversely related to the completed duration of the inflow into unem-
ployment, which is to be explained in terms of indicators of the unemployment
compensation system and other control variables.  The various studies differ in the
specification of the hazard rate and, in particular, the way potential benefit–entitle-
ment effects are modelled.  As to the latter, the studies vary from the simple inclusi-
on of dummy variables for the entitlement to ALG or ALH at the beginning of a
spell to the explicit modelling of changes in actual entitlement periods as derived
from legal regulations and treated as a time–varying covariate.
Based on the first three waves of the Socio–Economic Panel for west Germany
(GSOEP–west), Hujer, Löwenbein and Schneider (1991) find that the level of un-
employment compensation and the entitlement–to–ALG dummy do not affect the
hazard rate from unemployment significantly, whereas the ALH dummy reduces it
substantially.  The authors also included a dummy variable with a value of one (and
zero otherwise) if entitlement to ALG was at most 2 months until exhaustion and
found a very strong negative effect of this variable on the hazard rate from unem-
ployment.  Wurzel (1990) also included a dummy for the entitlement to ALG as an
explanatory variable in a hazard rate model and found statistically insignificant ef-
fects of this variable on the hazard rate from unemployment in all specifications.  In
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 Steiner and Kraus (1995) also analyze entitlement effects in east Germany and find relatively
strong effects for east German males.
9a more general model, Wurzel (1993) accounted for potential differences in entitle-
ment effects between various demographic groups and also controlled for heteroge-
neity in offered wages by including the individual expected wage (derived from
standard wage equations) as additional explanatory variable.  The estimated effects
differ somewhat between gender and age groups and also depend on the specificati-
on of the particular model, but overall no strong effects seem to emerge from these
estimates.  In contrast, Steiner (1994) found relatively strong effects from the entit-
lement to unemployment compensation (benefits or assistance) on the hazard rate,
whereas marginal reductions in the level of unemployment compensation had very
little effect.
Hunt (1995) makes use of the so–called difference–in–difference approach and the
various changes in entitlement periods for particular groups in the 1980s to estimate
the effect of these changes on the duration of unemployment.6 In this approach, in-
dividuals are divided into two groups: the treatment group refers to the unemployed
to whom a change in some law or regulation applies, whereas those unaffected by
these changes belong to the control group.  The effect of a law change on some out-
come variable, e.g. the duration of unemployment, is the difference of the outcomes
for the treatment and control groups before and after the law change7.  In a hazard
rate model framework, a dummy for the period to which the new regulation refers
and treatment group dummies as well as interaction terms between these and the
period dummy are included as explanatory variables together with other control va-
riables.  The estimated coefficient on these interaction terms then gives the effect of
a law change after controlling for pure period and treatment group effects.  Ob-
viously, this methodology can easily be extended to several changes in regulations
within the observation period and a varying number of treatment groups by inclu-
ding appropriate dummy variables and interaction terms.
The treatment groups considered by Hunt (1995) consist of the unemployed without
children, for whom there was a reduction in unemployment compensation at the be-
ginning of 1984 which remained in effect throughout the observation period (see
section 2.2), and three age groups. The control group consists of those aged below
42 years for whom entitlement periods have not changed within the observation pe-
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 Hunt (1995, Table 6) also presents estimation results for a simple competing risks model
(escapes to employment and to out–of–the–labor–force, respectively) with dummies for the
receipt of ALG or ALH and the level of unemployment compensation included as exogene-
ous variables, but without conditioning on the (expected) wage.  She finds that entitlement to
ALG significantly (insignificantly) increases the hazard rate in employment (to out of the la-
bor force), while entitlement to ALH reduces both hazard rates significantly, and that the
level of unemployment compensation has no significant effect on hazard rates.
7
 For a survey on this and related approaches to the empirical analysis of policy impact analy-
sis with non–experimental data see, e.g. Meyer (1995).
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riod. The age groups and the four period dummies are defined according to the law
changes summarized in section 2.2 above, and the interaction terms are defined ac-
cordingly. One crucial assumption implicit in the construction of the treatment
group dummies is that, given an unemployed belongs to a certain age group, the
maximum period of ALG–entitlement is obtained.  As mentioned in section 3.1, this
does not correspond to the way the German unemployment insurance system works,
and is also not compatible with actual or potential entitlement periods as observed
in the data (see section 4.2 below).8
On the basis of a simple hazard rate model and data from GSOEP for the period Ja-
nuary 1983 to December 1988 Hunt (1995) finds significant benefit–entitlement
effects.  For both males and females in the age group 44 – 48 years there seem to be
negative effects on the hazard rate to employment, but they refer to different time
periods, January 1986 to June 1987 for females and July 1987 to December 1988
for males, respectively.  Since the extension of the entitlement periods occurred at
the same time for males and females, it is not quite clear how to interpret these gen-
der differences.  Furthermore, it also remains unclear why this effect only shows up
for this age group and not for older workers as well, for whom entitlement periods
were extended even more.  However, for older women (aged 49 – 57 years) the ex-
tension of entitlement periods seems to have reduced the out–of–the–labor–force
hazard rate substantially.9
Hujer and Schneider (1996) extend this approach by including a variable for an in-
dividual's potential ALG–entitlement period at the beginning of the spell, dummies
for the remaining ALG–entitlement period, a dummy for ALH–entitlement, and the
income–replacement ratio.  The dummies for the remaining ALG–entitlement pe-
riod should account for the dynamics of the entitlement effect, where the hypothesis
to be tested is that the shorter the remaining period gets the greater the incentive to
take up a job offer and, hence, the higher the hazard rate from unemployment beco-
mes (see section 2.1).  In contrast to Hunt (1995), the authors derived the potential
entitlement period at the beginning of an unemployment spell instead of simply
using the maximum entitlement period as given by the legal regulations for all the
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 Hunt (1995, p. 112) notes that she also ran regressions "with the treatment groups defined as
a function of experience as well as age", but it is not clear to me how exactly this was done
(see also her footnote 20 on that page).
9
 For example, Hunt (1995, Table 10) reports an estimated coefficient on the period3 × aged
49–57 years dummy of –1.36, which would imply that the out–of–the–labor–force hazard
rate would be only about a fourth the level of that of the reference person not entitled to an
extended benefit period.  Note, however, that for a relatively low level of the out–of–the–la-
bor–force hazard rate the effect on the overall hazard rate from unemployment would ne-
vertheless be modest (see section 4.3 below).
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unemployed by using information on the actual number of months for which ALG
was received from the calendar information in the GSOEP (see the appendix).
As in Hunt (1995), the authors find that the extension of benefit–entitlement periods
in the 1980's has only affected the hazard rate of those males aged 44 years and ol-
der who became unemployed after July 1987.  For females in the age groups 44 – 48
years as well as 49 years and older who became unemployed after Janurary 1986,
Hujer and Schneider (1996) also find very strong negative effects on the out–of–the
labor–force hazard rate, which they interpret as evidence for the hypothesis that fe-
males tend to leave the labor–force just after their entitlement to benefits has been
exhausted.  On the other hand, for females the income–replacement ratio has a si-
gnificantly positive effect on the employment hazard rate for females and no stati-
stically significant effect on the out–of–the labor–force hazard rate.  For males en-
titled to ALG, the authors find no statistically significant effect of the income–re-
placement–ratio on the hazard rate from unemployment.  In contrast, ALH–entitle-
ment has a relatively strong negative effect on the hazard rate into employment and,
for females, out–of–the–labor–force as well.
The length of the ALG–entitlement period has a strong negative effect on the male
hazard rate into employment which falls in a stepwise fashion with the decreasing
remaining months of entitlement and suddenly jumps up when ALG is exhausted.
For females, the length of the potential benefit–entitlement period does not affect
the hazard rate into employment, but has a relatively strong positive effect on the
out–of–the–labor–force hazard rate.  On its own, this latter result seems surprising.
However, in interpreting it the effects of the dummies for the remaining months of
benefit–entitlement have also to be taken into account.  These variables show very
strong negative effects on the hazard rate out–of–the–labor–force and, to a lesser
extent, into employment as well.
To sum up, it seems fair to say that the reviewed empirical studies do not provide a
consistent picture of the effects of unemployment compensation on the duration of
individual unemployment in Germany.  One result on which some agreement seems
to exist is that marginal variations of unemployment benefits have only very small
effects on the hazard rate, if any.  The effects of the entitlement to ALG or ALH
tend to be much more important quantitatively, but seem to depend very much on
the way these effects are modelled, and also to differ between males and females.
The econometric model described in the next section encompasses most of the spe-
cifications found in previous research and thus allows to draw more general conclu-
sions.
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4 Econometric Analysis
4.1 Hazard Rate Model
Following the standard approach, reduced–form hazard rate models are estimated to
quantify benefit–entitlement effects on individual unemployment durations [for ge-
neral surveys of hazard rate models see, e.g., Kiefer (1988) or Lancaster (1990)].
Given the discrete measurement of unemployment durations derived from the
monthly calendar data in the GSOEP and the associated heavy ties of observations,
it seems more appropriate to specify a discrete rather than a conventional conti-
nuous–time hazard rate model as employed in the studies reviewed in the previous
section.
The formal structure of the econometric model is the following.  The duration of an
individual's k–th unemployment spell is described by a non–negative random varia-
ble, T, which takes on integer values only.  If an unemployment spell ends in the
interval I It t−1,   this variable takes on a value of T = t, where the spell can either
end in employment or in the out–of–the–labor–force state.  The central variable for
modelling the transition process from unemployment into any one of these two sta-
tes is the discrete state–specific hazard rate.  For the i–th person the hazard rate in
spell k  into state j in interval t, λ ijk t( ) , is the conditional probability of a transition
into state j in this interval, given individual i has been unemployed until t, i.e.,
(1) λ ε εijk i im ik ik i imt x t P T t j T t x t| , , | , ,( ) = = = ≥ ( )  Ω
with i = 1,2,...n;     j = 1,2;     k =1,2,...Ki;
x ti ( ) = vector of covariates of individual i  in intervall t
Ω = 1, if transition into employment
= 2, if transition out–of–the–labor–force
ε i
m
= time–invariant individual effect, where
E E x ti
m
M
m
M
i
m
i( ) ( ( )) ,ε ε ε ε ε= = ∀
= =
∑ ∑P(  )  = 0;  P(  ) = 1;    m (m =1,2,...M)im im im
1 1
0 .
The time–invariant individual effect, εi, accounts for unobserved population hetero-
geneity in the hazard rates and is assumed to come from an arbitrary discrete pro-
bability distribution with a small number of mass points, ε im  (m=1,2,..M).  These
mass points and their probabilities, P(ε im), are simultanously estimated with the pa-
rameters of the model.  This individual effect is assumed to be uncorrelated with the
set of explanatory variables in the model, xi(t). The variables of main interest here
are related to the unemployment compensation system.  They encompass the various
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specifications of benefit–entitlement effects found in the previous German studies
summarized above.  That is, they include the income–replacement ratio and, alter-
natively, dummies for the entitlement to ALG or ALH at the beginning of the un-
employment spell, interaction terms accounting for treatment–group effects, and
benefit–entitlement periods as as a time–varying covariate. These variables are
briefly described in the next section and, in more detail, in the appendix.  In addi-
tion to these variables, xi(t) includes variables that control for differences in indivi-
dual characteristics and other observed factors affecting individual unemployment
behavior (see section 4.2).  Note that some of these variables, e.g. the regional un-
employment rate, not only depend on process time, i.e. the month of the unemploy-
ment spell, but also on historical time.
Conditional on the vector of covariates and the individual effect, transitions into the
two states are independent and can thus be modelled as competing risks.10  The ha-
zard rate from unemployment is therefore given by
(2) λ ε λ εk i im jk
j
i i
mt x t t x t| , | ,( ) = ( )
=
∑   
1
2
In terms of the hazard rate, the probability of remaining unemployed in period
t conditional on having been in that state up to period t −1 is simply given by
(3) P T t T t x t t x tk k i im k i im> ≥ ( ) = − ( )| , , | ,ε λ ε1  
The survivor function gives the (unconditional) probabilty of remaining unem-
ployed up to period t; in terms of the hazard rate it can be written as
(4) P T t x t S t x t x tk i im k i im k i im
t
> ( ) = ( ) = − ( )
=
−∏| , | , | ,ε ε λ τ ε
τ
      1
1
1
The probability of a transition into state j  in period t  in terms of the respective ha-
zard rates is
(5) P T t j x t t x t x tk i im jk i im k i im
t
= = ( ) = ( ) − ( )
=
−∏, | , | , | ,Ω ε λ ε λ τ ε
τ
      1
1
1
The hazard rates are modelled by means of random–effects logits with three distinct
choices (states), namely unemployment, employment and out–of–the–labor–force,
the first one being the base category, i.e.,
                                          
10
 Of course, without conditioning on the individual effect transitions into the two states will be
correlated.
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The so–called "baseline" hazard, α j t( ) , describes the dependence of the hazard rate
on process time ("duration dependence").  To avoid the danger of seriously misspe-
cifying the model, the baseline hazard is modelled in a flexible way by a set of
dummy variables.  Also note that the specification of the hazard rates in equ. (6)
does not imply the rather restrictive proportional hazard assumption on which the
empirical models estimated in the studies reviewed in the previous section typically
rely.  In the present application, this assumption would be rather restrictive because
it implies that, say, potential benefit–entitlement effects on the hazard are indepen-
dent of the duration of unemployment.
The corresponding survivor function for this model is
(7) S t x t
x
k
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which will be used to simulate the effects of changes in the unemployment compen-
sation system on the duration of unemployment below.
To derive the sample likelihood function for this model, the indicator variable
c
k i
ik =

    if the - th unemployment spell of individual  is right - censored
0,  otherwise                                                                                      
1,
is defined.  Right–censored observations include interrupted spells either at the end
of the observation period or related to sample attrition.  Following usual practice, it
is assumed that the censoring mechanism is non–informative (i.e., random).  Since
there is no operational way to include information on left–censored spells in the li-
kelihood function in a consistent way, they are excluded from the sample.
Defining another indicator variable
δ ikj
k i j
=

    if the - th unemployment spell of individual  ends in state 
  0,  otherwise,
1,
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and assuming that, conditional on the explanatory variables in the model and the
individual effect, all observations are independent11, the sample likelihood function
is given by
(8) L P t x t xim
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For a completed unemployment spell the contribution to the likelihood function is
given by the respective state–specific hazard rate, for a censored spell it is given by
the survivor function, which is written in terms of the overall hazard rate here.  Note
that due to the individual effect all observations for a given individual—both within
and between spells—are correlated, conditionally on the previous state and the set
of explanatroy variables.
The likelihoold function (8) is maximized with respect to the coefficients on the ba-
seline hazard, the coefficients on the explanatory variables and the mass–points to-
gether with the corresponding probabilities, P mε , taking into account the restricti-
ons on the individual effects given in eq. (1) by standard numerical optimization
procedures.
4.2 Data
The econometric model of the previous section is estimated on waves 1 – 12 of the
Socio–Economic Panel for West Germany (GSOEP) covering the period January
1983 to 1994.12  In the first wave some 12,000 individuals older than sixteen years
of age living in about 6,000 households were interviewed.  In the subsequent waves
of the panel the same people were followed up and "new" households, of which at
least one was member of the households initially included, were added to compen-
sate for sample attrition.  In each panel wave detailled information on an individu-
al's labor–force status and various types of income as well as personal and house-
hold characteristics and other variables relevant for the explanaton of individual
unemployment behavior (see below) is collected.  In addition, at the date of inter-
view of each wave, retrospective monthly "calendar" information on an individual's
detailed labor force status in each month of the previous calendar year is recorded.
                                          
11
 Although the assumption that individual observations are independent in the sample is stan-
dard in microeconometric models of individual (unemployment) behavior, it need not hold in
the population.
12
 Details on the GSOEP can be obtained from the webserver of the German Institute of Eco-
nomic Research (DIW) in Berlin (http://www.diw–berlin.de/soep/).
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Depending on the wave, there are between eight and ten different categories for an
individual’s labor force status, which can be aggregated into the following three la-
bor–force states:
(i) unemployment
(ii) employment
(iii) out–of–the–labor–force.
Since the questionnaire refers to registered unemployment, its definition used here
is, in principle, the same as in official statistics, and has the same well–known pro-
blems of both over– and underreporting.  It also corresponds to one of the basic re-
quirement for the entitlement to unemployment benefits mentioned in section 2.2.
The employment state includes full–time, part–time and temporary employment as
well as vocational training in firms.  The out–of–the–labor–force state comprises
people in (early) retirement, in full–time education, on military service, working at
home, and "others".  The unemployed aged 58 years and older are excluded from
the sample because of the special regulations for this age group described in section
2.2.  Persons previously employed in seasonal industries, like the construction indu-
stry, farming and forestry, are also excluded from the analyzed sample because there
are special regulations regarding benefit–entitlement periods for them and—since a
large proportion of them is on temporary layoff—their labor market behavior is li-
kely to differ substantially from that of the other unemployed.  A very small number
of civil servants who became unemployed in the observation period was also exclu-
ded from the sample.
Completed durations of individual unemployment spells are derived from informa-
tion on the date of entry into unemployment and the date of the transition from this
state into states (ii) or (iii) defined above.  Interrupted durations of right–censored
spells are calculated from the entry date and the date an unemployed is observed for
the last time in the GSOEP, which also includes sample attrition.  Unemployment
spells which began before January 1983 or for which no calendar information from
the previous year is available are treated as left–censored and excluded from the
sample.  The number of unemployment spells beginning between January 1983 and
December 1994 is 2,828 for males and 2,159 for females.  After the groups men-
tioned above were excluded from the sample, 1,736 male and 1,766 female unem-
ployment spells remained in the sample (see Table 2). Of those, 72,9% (58.3%) en-
ded in employment, 10,3% (27.1%) left the labor force, and 16,8% (14.5%) were
right–censored at the time they were observed in the sample for the last time.  The
number of analyzed spells refer to 1,125 males and 1,210 females, respectively.
Hence, even though the unemployed previously employed in seasonal industries
were excluded from the sample repeat, unemployment spells were quite important
within the observation period.
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Information on an individual’s actual entitlement to ALG or ALH is available on a
monthly basis from the income calendar data in the GSOEP.  Table 2 shows the ab-
solute and relative number of all unemployment spells covered by ALG or ALH, the
respective number of spells with censored or exhausted entitlement periods, and the
number and ratio of spells with ALH coverage either after the exhaustion of ALG or
without prior entitlement to benefits.  Of all spells analyzed about 50% received
ALG and 10% ALH, where these percentages differ little between males and fema-
les.  About two–thirds of all spells ended before the exhaustion of ALG–entitle-
ment, which was followed by ALH–entitlement for 12.8% of males and 7.8% of
females. ALH without previous ALG–entitlement, i.e. "originäre" ALH, was recei-
ved by about 50% of all unemployed in the sample.
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Table 2—Unemployment spells and benefit–entitlement
Males Females
# % # %
(1) All spells 2828 100 2159 100
Previously employed in seasonal industries 642 22.7 42 1.9
Previously employed as civil servant 30 1.1 17 0.1
Age > 57 years at spell begin 144 5.1 74 3.4
Left–censored 276 9.8 260 12.0
(2) Spells analyzed 1736 100 1766 100
(3) Received ALG during spell, % of (2) 892 51.4 943 53.4
(4) Received ALH during spell, % of (2) 217 12.5 159 9.0
Spell ended before ALG exhaustion, % of (3) 575 64.5 631 66.9
Spell censored before ALG exhaustion,% of (3) 84 9.4 53 5.6
Spells with exhausted ALG, % of (3) 233 26.1 259 27.5
ALH on exhaustion of ALG, % of (3) 114 12.8 74 7.8
ALH without prior ALG–entitlement, % of (4) 103 47.5 85 53.5
Notes:
(a) ALG = unemployment benefits; ALH = unemployment assistance.
(b) The number of spells analyzed refers to those available for estimation of the hazard rate mo-
dels in Table 5, i.e. after exlusion of all spells with missing values in any of the explanatory
variables in the models estimated.
Source: GSOEP, waves 1 – 12; own calculations.
To model dynamic entitlement effects, information on an individual’s potential
ALG–entitlement period at the beginning of the unemployment spell is required.
This information is not directly available in the GSOEP but can be derived by com-
bining monthly calendar data and retrospectively collected employment information
available (for the derivation see the appendix). The remaining benefit–entitlement
period in a particular month of the unemployment spell is then simply calculated by
subtracting the respective number of months from the potential entitlement period at
the beginning of the unemployment spell.  For the sample we analyze below this
more involved imputation yields an average potential entitlement period at the be-
ginning of the unemployment spell of 9.0 months for males and 8.5 months for fe-
males.  These values are only slightly lower than those one obtains by using the
simpler imputation method employed by Hujer and Schneider (1996)—9.2 and 8.7
months, respectively—and both measures are considerable shorter than the maxi-
mum benefit–entitlement period of 14.3 and 13.8 months implicitely used by Hunt
(1995).
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There are various ways to model the income–replacement ratio, in particular with
respect to the income measure to which the amount of ALG received is to be com-
pared [see Atkinson and Micklerwright (1991)].  The measure used here refers to
expected net earnings in the new job:  It thus corresponds to the theoretical frame-
work outlined in section 2 but differs from the one used by Steiner (1994) and Hujer
and Schneider (1996) calculated on the basis of earnings in the previous job.  Ex-
pected net earnings are derived from empirical wage equations and a simple tax
function estimated on the basis of the GSOEP as described in the appendix.  The
income–replacement ratio is calculated as the ratio of the amount of monthly unem-
ployment benefits, which is income–tax free, and the net expected monthly wage in
employment.  This procedure yielded a mean replacement ratio of about 0.5 with a
standard deviation of 0.2 for those receiving ALG, where there is very little diffe-
rence between males and females.  The amount of unemployment benefits (ALG or
ALH) received in real terms rather than the income–replacement ratio is included in
the out–of–the–labor–force hazard rate because the expected wage in employment is
obviously not an appropriate measure for the expected household income when lea-
ving the labor–force, which depends in the change of other member's income due to
taxes, and social transfers.  Lacking such a measure, non–labor household income,
the employment status of the spouse, and his or her earnings should proxy the alter-
native income in the out–of–the–labor–force state.
In addition to the variables describing the unemployment compensation system the
set of regressors also includes the usual control variables, such as personal characte-
ristics, indicators of household composition, human capital variables and indicators
for the state of the aggregate labor market.  Some information on these variables is
contained in Table A1 in the data appendix, which refers to the preferred model
specification presented in section 4.3.3 below.  Spells with missing values on any of
the variables included in the estimated hazard rate models were dropped from the
sample.
4.3 Estimation Results
The presentation of estimation results starts with the most simple specification
which includes two dummy variables for the entitlement to ALG and ALH as well
as the level of unemployment compensation.  This kind of specification has been
used in most of the studies summarized in section 3 and thus serves as the reference
model and as the starting point for the more sophisticated analysis reported below.
In the following subsection, estimation results for the model with treatment group
dummies as used by Hunt (1995) and, in a somewhat extended form, also by Hujer
and Schneider (1996) are presented.  The final estimates refer to a more general
specification of the unemployment compensation system with the remaining months
of entitlement as a time–varying explanatory variable.  The estimates from this spe-
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cification are then used to simulate benefit–entitlement effects on the duration of
unemployment.
4.3.1 Standard Specification
Estimation results for the "standard" specification of unemployment compensation
effects on the hazard rate from unemployment are reported in Table 3A for males
and in Table 3B for females.  For males, the relatively few out–of–the–labor–force
transitions are not explicitely modelled but are treated as right–censored in the esti-
mation.  Since the focus of this paper is on the effects of unemployment compensa-
tion on the hazard rate, estimation results for the control variables will not be
discussed here.  Suffice it to note that they do to some extent control for the hetero-
geneity in the sample, but unobserved heterogeneity remains quantitatively im-
portant.  Likelihood ratio tests have shown that three (two) heterogeneity groups,
i.e. mass points, are sufficient to account for remaining unobserved heterogeneity in
the male (female) sample.  These mass points and their probabilities are reported at
the bottom of Tables 3A and 3B.13
Except for the coefficients of the baseline dummies, controlling for unobserved he-
terogeneity has very little effect on the parameter estimates.  It is well known that
the negative dependence of the hazard rate into employment on the duration of un-
employment tends to disappear if heterogeneity in the sample is adequately con-
trolled for [see, e.g., Steiner (1994)].  This result is also obtained here.  Whereas the
estimates for the models without unobserved heterogeneity [not shown here] imply
negative duration dependence of the hazard rate into employment for both males
and females, the estimated baseline hazards in Tables 3A and 3B show that the ba-
seline hazard slightly increases for males and remains constant for females throug-
hout the unemployment spell.  For females, the out-of-the-labor-force hazard rate
increases significantly after the first few months, again after the ninth month and
then remains at that higher level.
In Tables 3A and 3B, the effect of the entitlement to ALG or ALH in any particular
month during the unemployment spell on the hazard rate into employment and non–
participation is to be interpreted together with the effect of the income–replacement
ratio and the amount of unemployment compensation, respectively. Estimated
coefficients imply that, for an income–replacement ratio of about 60%, its effect on
the hazard rate into employment is slightly negative both for males and females.
Marginal changes in the level of benefits have very little effect on individual re–
employment probabilities.
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13
 These probabilities can be interpreted as the respective proportion of the unemployed in the
sample belonging to one of the three (two) heterogeneity groups.
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In contrast, entitlement to ALH reduces the re–employment hazard substantially,
especially for males, and has a strong negative effect on the out–of–the–labor–force
hazard rate for females. Hunt (1995) also obtains significant negative (positive) ef-
fects of entitlement to ALH (ALG) on hazard rates.  She speculates that the latter
variable may act as a proxy for recent labor market experience rather than account
for entitlement effects.  Note that my specification includes an individual's previous
labor force state as a proxy for recent labor market experience, which has a rather
strong negative effect on the female re–employment hazard but only a weak effect
for males.
4.3.2 Specification with Treatment Groups
Estimation results from models including, in addition to all the control variables in
the specification of the previous subsection, period–group interaction terms as ex-
planatory variables are summarized for males and females in Table 4.  In this speci-
fication, the effects of changes in legal regulations in unemployment compensation
rules on hazard rates are measured by the coefficients on the period–group interac-
tion terms, i.e. treatment groups for short.  Since estimated coefficients of the con-
trol variables change very little compared to those of the previous estimates, they
are not reported here.
Estimation results show that only the period3 × aged 44–48 years–dummy has the
expected negative effect on the re–employment hazard rate.  This effect refers to the
same treatment group for which Hunt (1995) and Hujer and Schneider (1996) ob-
tained a significant effect on the re–employment hazard, though their point estimate
is only about half the size of the one obtained here.  Contrary to these authors, I do
not find any significant entitlement effect on the female out–of–the–labor–force ha-
zard rate, however.  Nor do I find, as in Hunt (1995), evidence for the hypothesis
that the reduction of unemployment compensation for those without children has
increased the out–of–the–labor–force hazard rate. Furthermore, for the male re–em-
ployment hazard rate the large positive coefficient of the period3 × aged 49–53 ye-
ars–dummy does not correspond to prior expectations.
There are at least two potential short–comings of the specification relying on treat-
ment groups which may severely bias estimation results.  First, as the calculation of
potential benefit–entitlement periods reported in section 4.2 has shown, the as-
sumption that people falling into a particular treatment group are in fact entitled to
draw ALG for the maximum period is far off the mark. Second, the effects of the
treatment group dummies may vary over the duration of the unemployment spell,
which the specification in this subsection does not allow for.  The next subsection
summarizes estimation results for specifications of entitlement effects which take
these factors into account.
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4.3.3 Specification with Remaining Entitlement Period
The dynamic pattern of benefit–entitlement effects can be modelled by including
the remaining number of months of ALG–entitlement as time–varying covariate in
the hazard rate model.  As mentioned in section 2.1, there are two dynamic effects
on the re–employment hazard rate; first, the shorter the remaining entitlement pe-
riod becomes the higher the hazard rate gets and, second, the hazard increases shar-
ply in the month of benefit exhaustion.  To account for non–linearities of entitle-
ment effects on the hazard rate, they are modelled by means of dummy variables
here. Estimation results for this specification are contained in Table 5.
As before, estimation results for the control variables are not reported, because they
change very little compared to those reported in Tables 3A and 3B, respectively.  Of
course, since the (remaining) potential entitlement period is just another (and better)
proxy for treatment groups, the period–group interaction terms of the previous sub-
section are not included here.  The estimated coefficients of the dummies for the
remaining month of benefit–entitlement refer to the base category of 18 or more
months. In order to have a sufficient number of observations in each category, se-
veral months had to be aggregated.  The effect of changing from one entitlement
period to the next closer one to the date of benefit exhaustion is thus, ceteris pari-
bus, given by the difference in the estimated coefficients of the two respective en-
titlement categories ("pure entitlement effect").  Since this also implies a correspon-
ding change in the duration of unemployment, this pure entitlement effect is com-
pounded by the pure duration dependence effect which is accounted for by the ba-
seline hazard.  These two effects are identified from the variation of individual be-
nefit–entitlement periods at the beginning of the unemployment spell [see Meyer
(1990)].  Furthermore, the ALG– and ALH–entitlement dummies as well as the in-
come–replacement ratio or the amount of unemployment compensation also may
change at the month when entitlement to ALG is exhausted.  Hence, to calculate the
effect of moving from one month of remaining entitlement to the exhaustion point
one has to add these effects to the "pure entitlement effect" after taking into account
changes in the baseline hazard rate.
The dynamic pattern of entitlement effects implied by the estimates in Table 5 is
illustrated in Figure 1 for males and Figures 2A and 2B for females.  The plots refer
to a particular reference group of unemployed who are assumed to have become un-
employed between July 1987 and December 1992, to be between 44 – 48 years old
and have other characteristics defined by the respective base category for dummy
variables and sample means for metric variables [see Table A1 in the appendix].
The hazard rates are calculated for potential ALG–entitlement periods at the spell
begin of between 0 and 18 months.
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The comparison of the hazard rate for the unemployed without benefit–entitlement
(entitlement period = 0 months) and those with the same characteristics but, say, 12
months of potential ALG–entitlement shows the "pure" entitlement effect for each
month.  To illustrate the effect of entitlement to ALH on the hazard rates, the plots
also distinguish between the unemployed with and without ALH–entitlement after
the exhaustion of ALG.  The plots show "averaged" hazards calculated as the
weighted sum of the hazard rates over the three (two) male (female) heterogeneity
groups, where the weights are the estimated probabilities of the corresponding mass
points (see section 4.1).
For males without entitlement to unemployment benefits, the estimated re–employ-
ment hazard rate is about 15% per month at the beginning of the spell; subsequently
it declines slowly with an intermittent increase between the 10th and 12th month.14
For those receiving ALG the evolution of the hazard rate is over time depends on
the potential entitlement period at the spell begin and on subsequent ALH–entitle-
ment. Whereas the hypothesis that the hazard rate increases monotonically with a
decreasing number of months of ALG–entitlement is not confirmed by the shape of
the hazard plots, one effect suggested by the theoretical models referred to in sec-
tion 2.1 is borne out very clearly for males.  If ALH is not available the re–employ-
ment hazard rate jumps upwards in the month after exhaustion of ALG–entitlement
and subsequently remains at this much higher level.  This effect is illustrated in Fi-
gure 1 for an initial entitlement period of 6, 12, and 18 months, respectively.  In
contrast, the re–employment hazard of those unemployed men receiving ALH re-
mains at the level it has reached the month before the exhaustion of ALG–entitle-
ment.
For females, the plots in Figure 2A do not show any systematic entitlement effects
on the re–employment hazard rate, which also does not differ significantly between
those with and without ALH–entitlement.  As Figure 2B shows, there is some evi-
dence for entitlement effects on the out–of–the labor force hazard rate for female
who are not entitled to ALH after exhaustion of ALG, but this hazard is too low for
this effect to have a noticeable impact on the duration of unemployment (see simu-
lations below).
Estimated entitlement effects differ between age groups and are also likely to de-
pend on general labor market conditions.  To quantify these effects, in Table 6 we
                                          
14
 The decline in the hazard is related to the "averaging" of the unobserved heterogeneity com-
ponents.  Within the heterogeneity groups, i.e., for given j, male (female) hazard rates into
employment are slightly increasing (constant) in duration.  Assuming a constant hazard rate,
a monthly value of 15% would imply an average completed unemployment duration of about
7 months (in this case durations are exponentially distributed and the mean of the distributi-
on is equal to the reciprocal of the hazard).
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report survival probabilities after 6, 12, 18, and 24 months of unemployment for
various age groups in the period July 1987 to December 1992 and January 1993 to
December 1994, respectively.  Whereas the first period is characterized by a relati-
vely strong employment expansion and a substantial reduction in aggregate unem-
ployment, the second period refers to one of the most severe recessions in post–war
German history.  These survival probabilities are calcuted by inserting the estimated
coefficients from the hazard models in Table 5 into the survival function [equation
(7) in section 4.1], where the other observable characteristics are set at the same
values as for the reference group and unobserved individual effects are "averaged–
out" as described above.  More intuitively, these survival probabilities can also be
viewed as the proportion of the cohort of people in the reference group entering un-
employment in a particular month who are still unemployed after the respective
number of months.
Table 6Estimated age and time effects on survival rates in unemployment
Males Females
survival rate after ... months survival rate after ... months
6 12 18 24 6 12 18 24
Spell begin between July 1987 and Dec. 1992
Age<25 years 30.8 13.1 6.3 3.6 18.0 3.2 1.1 0.4
25≤Age≤41 yrs. 42.3 22.4 12.4 7.5 35.4 12.1 6.2 3.7
42≤Age<44 yrs. 47.8 27.8 16.7 10.5 49.3 23.3 14.7 10.2
44≤Age<49 yrs. 66.0 48.9 36.7 28.0 38.7 14.4 7.9 4.8
49≤Age<54 yrs. 70.6 54.8 43.2 34.5 64.3 39.6 29.3 23.0
Age≥54 years 87.1 78.0 70.5 64.2 84.6 69.5 61.1 54.9
Spell begin between Jan. 1993 and Dec. 1994
Age<25 years 48.6 28.7 17.4 11.0 33.1 10.4 5.1 2.8
25≤Age≤41 yrs. 59.2 40.5 28.2 20.0 52.3 26.0 16.9 11.9
42≤Age<44 yrs. 63.9 46.2 34.0 25.4 64.8 40.2 30.0 23.6
44≤Age<49 yrs. 78.1 65.0 54.8 46.8 55.5 29.3 19.9 14.5
49≤Age<54 yrs. 81.4 69.7 60.4 52.8 76.3 56.2 46.3 39.5
Age≥54 years 92.5 86.7 81.5 76.9 90.1 79.3 72.8 67.7
Notes:
(a) Survival rates are given in percent.
(b) Dummy–variables are set at the respective base category, metric variables at their values
at sample means.
Source:  Calculations are based on estimation results in Table 5.
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Table 6 shows that, except for females aged 44 to 49 years15, survival probabilities
are strongly increasing in age.  Only about 13% of males and 3% of females aged
below 25 years who became unemployed in the period July 1987 to December 1992
remained in that state for more than a year.  The respective survival probabilities for
the oldest age group (	 54 years) were almost 80% and 70%, respectively.  Survival
probabilities in unemployment estimated for the period July 1987 and December
1992 are, ceteris paribus, markedly smaller than those estimated for the subsequent
period.  This holds for all age groups, but cyclical effects seem to have a stronger
relative impact on younger workers’ survival probabilities in unemployment.
4.4 Simulation of Benefit Entitlement Effects
On the basis of the estimation results in the previous sub–section, simulation results
of the quantitative effects of changes in entitlement periods and the level of the in-
come–replacement ratio are presented in Table 7.  The simulations again refer to the
44 to 48–years old reference group defined above in the period July 1987 to De-
cember 1992. They show how the proportion of unemployed people in this refe-
rence group changes ceteris paribus if the parameters of the unemployment benefit
system are varied one at a time. For different age groups and the subsequent time
period, the simulated effects of variations of the parameters of the unemployment
insurance system on survival rates would differ in levels but not in relative size.
Simulation A in Table 7 shows that 43.5% (36.9%) of all males (females) in the re-
ference group with no benefit–entitlement remain unemployed for at least 6 months,
and 18.3% (13.6)% for at least a year.  Note that the relatively low female survival
rates are due to the choice of the reference group which refers to skilled singles
aged 44 to 48 years without children, whose work motivation presumably is rather
high.  If the unemployed are entitled to ALG and subsequently to ALH, simulated
survival rates for males are considerabIe higher and also depend on the length of the
entitlement period at the beginning of the spell (simulation B).  For example, the
12–month survival rate for an unemployed man in the reference group with an
ALG–entitlement period of 6 months and subsequent ALH–entitlement is almost
50%, while the respective value for someone without entitlement to ALH is just
about half this value (simulation C).  Likewise, for the male reference group with
longer ALG entitlement periods the share of those subsequently entitled to ALH
who remain unemployed longer than 12 months is always considerably higher than
those whose benefit–entitlement period has expired.
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 However, the differences in estimated coefficients of the three age dummies for the 42 to 44
and the 45 to 49 years’ old females do not seem to be statistically significant (we have not
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formally tested for joint significance of the difference of the  respective coefficients in the
employmet and out–of–the labor force hazards).
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However, there seems to be no monotonic relationship between the length of the
entitlement period and the share of long–term unemployed men without ALH–en-
titlement, as the comparison of the 12–months' survival rate between the different
ALG entitlement groups shows.  Furthermore, survival rates for those entitled to
ALH seem to be negatively related to the length of the ALG–entitlement period.16
For females, survival rates differ little between simulations A, B and C.  Thus, even
long ALG entitlement periods raise survival rates only modestly, and entitlement to
ALH does not seem to have any effect on long–term unemployment.
The comparison of simulations B and D show that even a rather large reduction of
the incomes replacement ratio of 20% (or a corresponding reduction in the amount
of unemployment compensation) has hardly any effect on unemployment survival
rates. For females, it would even result in higher survival rates, which seems im-
plausible but, given the small effects, is probably not statistically significant. As a
comparison of simulations C and E further show, the expected effects from varia-
tions of the level of unemployment compensation are also negligible for those not
entitled to ALH after exhaustion of ALG.
5 Summary and Conclusions
The results of the econometric analysis have shown that the entitlement to unem-
ployment benefits increases the duration of unemployment for males, but has very
little effect for females.  The prolongation of entitlement periods and its extension
to successively younger age groups in the eighties has thus increased unemployment
durations for males.  For females, benefit–entitlement in general has little effect on
the duration of unemployment.  This result contradicts the popular belief that disin-
centive effects of the unemployment insurance system are especially severe for fe-
males by prolonging "wait unemployment" before they withdraw from the labor
force.  Although females who are not entitled to unemployment assistance have a
higher propensity to leave the labor-force after their benefit-entitlement is exhau-
sted, this entitlement effect has little impact on the duration of unemployment due to
the very low level of the female out–of–the labor foce hazard rate.  Thus, the result
of a strong disincentive effect of unemployment assistance on the duration of female
unemployment reported in previous econometric studies for Germany does not seem
warranted.  The estimation results also show that, for both males and females, mar-
ginal reductions of the income–replacement ratio have very little effect on individu-
al unemployment behavior.
                                          
16 This result may be related to the "averaging–out" of unobserved heterogeneity in the calcula-
tion of survival rates.
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The recent reform of the unemployment insurance system successively increases the
minimum age for prolonged benefit–entitlement. Given the empirical results of this
paper hold up in the future, this should lead to some reduction in the duration of un-
employment among older men.  On the other hand, there is little reason to believe
that the reductions in benefit levels already enacted in the past have had substantial
effects on individual re–employment probabilities. The stiffer criteria for what is
considered a "suitable job" may in effect even increase the individually conceived
income–replacement ratio.  Furthermore, these criteria may also discourage efficient
job search and thus lead to allocative inefficiency in the labor market.  On the other
hand, unemployment assistance is still open–ended in principle, and, although me-
ans–tested, related to previous earnings.  Further reform of the unemployment assi-
stance system therefore seems to be required if the reduction of long–term unem-
ployment has a high priority on the economic policy agenda.
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